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Since the publication of “To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System” in 1999, 
there has been much research conducted into the epidemiology, nature and causes 
of medication error in children, from prescribing and supply to administration.  It is 
reassuring to see growing evidence to improve medication safety in children, however 
based on media reports, it can be seen that serious and fatal medication errors still 
occur.  This critical opinion article examines the problem of medication errors in 
children and provides recommendations for research, training of healthcare 
professionals and a culture shift towards dealing with medication error.  There are 
three factors that we need to consider to unravel what is missing and why do fatal 
medication errors still occur, 1. Who is involved and affected by the medication error? 
2. What factors hinder staff and organisations learning from mistakes? Does the fear 
of litigation and criminal charges deter healthcare professionals from voluntarily 
reporting medication errors? 3. What are the educational needs required to prevent 
medication error?    It is important to educate future healthcare professionals of 
medication error and human factors to prevent these from happening.   
Further research is required to apply aviation’s “black box” principles in healthcare to 
record and learn from near misses and errors to prevent future events.  There is an 
urgent need for the black box investigations to be published and made public for the 
benefit of other organisations that may have similar potential risks for adverse events.  







Medication errors in children are complex; they may involve and affect more than just 
the patient and healthcare professional, as the parent may also be involved in their 
occurrence.  
Fear of litigation and lack of immunity hinders and deters healthcare professionals 
from voluntarily reporting medication errors. 
The way forward to prevent medication errors in children requires increased learning 
by healthcare professionals from adverse events and near misses as well as increased 
education on human factors. Education should also be expanded to the public to 




Almost two decades since the publication of the seminal Institute of Medicine (IoM) 
report To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System [1], the question remains 
whether patient safety has improved?  This issue is particularly relevant to the delivery 
of medical care to children.   The pediatric population are at a higher risk of medication 
errors in comparison to adults [2-3], and have been shown to be three times more 
likely to be harmed when they occur [4]. 
Since the IoM report in 1999 [1], there has been much research conducted into the 
epidemiology, nature and causes of medication error in children, from prescribing and 
supply to administration.  Medication error has been studied using many methods, 
such as prospective observations of wards by trained data collectors given a definition 
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of medication error defined as errors in drug ordering, dispensing, administering or 
monitoring [4], as well as direct observations of drug charts and ward rounds to identify 
medication administration errors specifically [2].  Medication error theory has also been 
used to measure the impact of electronic prescribing and the reduction of medication 
errors as a result of its implementation in children [5].  
There have been many studies that have targeted areas at which pharmacists could 
make interventions and prevent errors from happening in children for example 
preventing medication errors at the interface of care from hospital admission to 
discharge and post discharge [6-9], and reducing prescribing errors via pharmacist 
intervention [10-11].  One of the areas in patient safety that has been recently explored 
relates to the potential for medication discrepancies to occur across the interface of 
care from hospital admission to discharge.  In 2006, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) included medication reconciliation as one of the five standardized patient 
safety solutions (known as the High 5s) [12].  Medication reconciliation is a process 
where medication lists are compared when a patient is transferred from one care 
setting to another – for example at hospital admission from home.  In the UK, the 
National Institute of Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 2007 produced a guideline 
advising hospital providers to conduct medication reconciliation in adults who were 
admitted into hospital to reduce medication errors. This guideline did not include 
children under the age of 16 years [6].   This exclusion, led to UK studies being 
conducted to build the body of evidence to establish if medication reconciliation was 
required in this age group.  A multi-site study in four different hospitals around England 
(Birmingham, London, Leeds and North Staffordshire) indicated that the incidence of 
potentially clinically harmful medication discrepancies occurring, in the absence of a 
pharmacist’s medication reconciliation, was 32% [7].   A small study in Ireland of 40 
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admissions into a general pediatric ward showed that 37.5% of patients had at least 
one unintended medication discrepancy at hospital admission [8].  At hospital 
discharge, it has been found that one in three discharge medication letters prior to a 
pharmacist amendment had at least one medication discrepancy [9].  
The identification of prescribing errors by pharmacists is another area of patient safety 
that has been explored.  A thirteen hospital site observation of documented pharmacist 
interventions revealed that 20.6% of 3330 patient charts had at least one medication 
error.  The most common type of error related to incorrect dose [10].   
The most recent patient safety strategy aimed at reducing prescribing errors in a 
Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) and Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) was the 
application of a site specific and defined “Zero Tolerance Policy” for prescribers. This 
policy governed i) who should write charts in the intensive care unit e.g. PICU/NICU 
staff with the exception of those preparing intrathecal preparation, ii) where and when 
prescriptions should be written, for example not during ward rounds and in an 
environment where nurses cannot distract the prescriber and iii) rules in relation to 
prescribing medication for patients [11].  The results of this study showed that 
implementing the concept of a site-specific “Zero Tolerance Policy” potentially 
decreased the risk of doctors making prescribing errors at a London (UK) Specialist 
Pediatric Hospital, with an absolute risk reduction of 44.5% (95% CI 40-48%) [11].  A 
recently reported study, published at a conference (2016), used the same “Zero 
Tolerance Policy” principle in a separate hospital setting across two audit cycles [13].  
In the first cycle of the audit, 376 prescriptions were accessed according to the local 
“Zero Tolerance” standards and individualised feedback reports were given to 
prescribers on their prescribing error rate and types. Additional reports were also 
generated to create posters that were displayed across the unit and were discussed 
6 
 
at clinical governance meetings.    This cycle was then repeated after a month and in 
the second cycle 275 prescriptions were assessed. A comparison of the prescribing 
across the two audit cycles showed no significant difference or reduction of the 
medication error rate, however there was a reduction when comparing individuals 
between each cycle which demonstrated that feedback for prescribers did lead to 
changes and improvements in prescribing practice [13].  
It is reassuring to see growing evidence to improve medication safety in children 
through identifying areas where errors occur in order to target resources and 
interventions, through improving education provided in relation to pediatric prescribing 
[14] and having pharmacists present to make interventions [10]. The research that has 
been done has not specifically focused on strategies to reduce errors that have the 
potential to cause serious harm, which may be a reason behind why harmful errors 
continue to occur.  Based on media reports, it can be seen that serious and fatal 
medication errors still occur.  This poses the question: what are we missing?   
The aims of this review are to discuss the current problem of serious medication errors 
and interventions that are in place to deal with these, the factors that affect and hinder 
error reporting and to identify any potential solutions and areas that require further 
research.   
2. The existing problem of serious medication errors and factors contributing 
towards it 
There are three factors that we need to consider to unravel what is missing and why 
fatal medication errors still occur: -  
1. Who is involved and affected by the medication error?  
2. What factors hinder staff and organisations learning from mistakes? 
7 
 
3. What are the educational needs required to prevent medication error? 
Each of these questions are discussed in detail in the next sections. 
2.1 Medication error – who is involved and affected? Patient, healthcare 
professional and the caregiver 
Firstly, we need to know who is involved and affected by the medication error. One 
example reported in the media was that of the case of an infant who died as a result 
of a tenfold overdose of furosemide. [15] The patient was having difficulties keeping 
down the amount of liquid prescribed due to the volume of the oral solution and so the 
family physician decided to prescribe a stronger concentration of furosemide liquid in 
order to reduce the volume required. However, the parent was unaware that the 
furosemide liquid preparation concentration had changed and continued to give the 
same volume of the liquid to the patient which led to the overdose. [15] The error not 
only resulted in the death of the baby, but subsequently led to the death of one of the 
parents which was reported solely by a tabloid newspaper [16].  In terms of human 
factors, the medication error operator, for example the doctor who wrote the 
prescription is often referred to as the second victim, however this case illustrates that 
given the complexity of pediatrics where dosing and administration will often involve 
the parent,  there is a hidden third victim. Identifying these additional second and third 
victims is important – the healthcare provider and caregiver responsible for the 
medication error can potentially suffer a medical emergency equivalent to post-
traumatic stress disorder and become a “patient” to the healthcare system themselves 
[17].  
Another case report, this time from a peer-reviewed journal,  highlighted the impact 
that an error can have of those involved whereby a 50-year-old nurse committed 
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suicide just 7 months after making a calculation error that led to an overdose and 
subsequent death of a critically ill infant [17].   
2.2 Factors hindering learning from mistakes 
Secondly, we need to understand what is hindering healthcare professionals from 
learning from and preventing medication errors.  In the aviation industry, when there 
is a major air disaster or a near miss event, there is a full forensic investigation 
including the black box recording that the investigational team can refer to.   
  In aviation, the black box is a computerized data recording device carried by modern 
commercial aircraft.  Information from this black box can be retrieved in an event where 
there was an accident or near miss during the flight.  The black box consists of a flight 
data recorder, which records at least eighty-eight important parameters with respect 
to time, such as the flight path, altitude, basic forces acting upon the aeroplane and 
resulting in the achieved flight path, the origin of these basic forces as well as a cockpit 
voice recorder [18].  There have been studies that have explored how this black box 
principle in aviation can be applied to healthcare. The management of adverse events 
in aviation and healthcare have been compared by Kapur and colleagues [19] as listed 
in table 1.  This recently published review shows that the management of aviation is 
more open in terms of its reporting –  every event is reported and every report is 
published, whereas in healthcare, major events (those leading to an adverse patient 
event or death) are only occasionally featured in the media.  In relation to immunity of 
the error operator, pilot immunity is often part of the reporting culture, however in 
healthcare, immunity is not necessarily part of the culture.   
There is a concern that there is a growing culture among society to criminalise and 
find a person to blame for fatal mistakes, which may as a result deter aviation and 
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healthcare professionals from voluntarily reporting their errors [20].  There have been 
a number of cases of criminal charges brought against healthcare professionals when 
errors have been made in both adult and pediatric settings. In the UK, a pharmacist 
Elizabeth Lee incorrectly dispensed propranolol to an elderly patient instead of 
prednisolone; the patient later died of an underlying issue and unrelated to the error 
[21].  Elizabeth Lee was given a suspended prison sentence in 2009 which was later 
substituted with a £400 fine which was reduced to £300 as a result of a guilty plea [22].  
A recent case from Northern Ireland shows that another pharmacist, Martin White 
made the exact same error, incorrectly dispensing propranolol instead of prednisolone 
to a patient who later died, which echoes and draws resemblance to that of Elizabeth 
Lee’s case [23].   Although a different allied healthcare profession, recently in the UK, 
there was a report of an optometrist who was prosecuted and taken to court for failing 
to identify bilateral papilloedema in a child aged 8, who died 5 months after the eye 
test. Although the parents in this case had called for leniency in sentencing, the 
optometrist was handed a two-year suspended prison sentence and charged with 
gross negligence and manslaughter [24].  In both of these cases, little is reported on 
how the organisations employing them responded to the error. Were there lessons 
learnt by the organisations where the pharmacists and optometrist worked to help 
prevent such an event from happening again?  Although the organisations may have 
reviewed procedures and implemented changes, as per aviation procedures, it would 
have been good for a full investigation to have taken place and also be reported and 
published for the benefit of the wider profession to learn from. 
   The issue of litigation and criminalisation of pharmacist errors has also been 
documented in the USA; one high profile case involved a former pharmacist Eric Cropp 
who was given a 6-month prison sentence for failing to detect a technician’s 
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chemotherapy mixing error which lead to the death of a 2 year old child [25].  This 
case was reported in 2009 in the Institute of Safe Medication Practices’ (ISMP) 
medication safety alert.  Ten years prior to  publishing this care report, the ISMP had 
banned the use of naming and shaming or “jeering”, where the institute would list 
individuals, organisations and companies that have taken a course of action that have 
frustrated error prevention efforts, for example hindering the progress of improving 
patient safety or making it worse.   However due to the fatal outcome and criminal 
prosecution, this error and the individual involved was published in the report [25].   
A focus group study conducted by the Canadian Institute of Safe Medication Practice, 
reported that the potential barriers to medication error reporting were reporter burden, 
professional indemnity, and fears – such as fear of anticipated negative attitudes from 
patients and a lack of trust about how error reports would be used [26].  Evidence from 
the media, safety organisations as well as research on overcoming barriers to 
medication error reporting suggests that due to fear of litigation, healthcare 
professionals may be reluctant to voluntarily report errors.  There needs to be a culture 
shift from blame to a just culture.  In the UK, there is no immunity for healthcare 
professionals who openly report their errors and there is no known legislation to protect 
the professionals from immunity.  In the USA, this may also be the case as seen with 
Eric Cropp’s prosecution and imprisonment.  It has been recommended in the past 
that in order to incentivise the reporting of medication errors, reports could be 
submitted anonymously [1].  The European Commission patient safety and quality of 
care working group recommends that any error reporting systems should be separated 
from formal complaints, disciplinary actions and litigation procedures [27].  However, 
recently (2015) in the UK, healthcare professional regulatory bodies such as the 
General Medical Council (GMC) and the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) have 
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advocated the duty of candour, where a healthcare professional should be open and 
honest when an error occurs and tell the patient and caregivers that an error has 
occurred [28].  The fact that there is no guaranteed immunity from prosecution, 
coupled with the duty of candour to be open and honest about errors, makes it difficult 
for a healthcare profession to truly remain anonymous outside of the immunity of the 
voluntary anonymised error reporting system, as they will have to speak with the 
patients and those affected to let them know that an error has occurred.  As a result 
of acting out the duty of candour, they are not protected from potential litigation which 
could lead to criminal charges.  
    In 2005, there was a case where due to human factors, a patient, Emily Bromiley 
died during a routine Ear Nose and Throat (ENT) surgical operation.  The patient’s 
husband, Martin Bromiley a commercial airline pilot, ensured that her case was 
reported and made publically available so that lessons could be learnt [29].  All the 
staff that had been involved in the incident returned to work.  It was found in this case 
that the fatal outcome of this event was not due to clinical inability of the staff but 
human factors [30].  In 2007 a Clinical Human Factors Group was set up – a coalition 
of healthcare professionals, managers and service users who have partnered with 
experts in Human Factors from healthcare and high risk industries to campaign for 
changes in the UK National Health Service (NHS) – a nationalised healthcare system 






2.3 The need for medication error theory, learning from near misses and human 
factors in the education of healthcare professionals and the public 
Finally, medication error theory and human factors need to be incorporated into the 
education of healthcare professionals and especially the training of pediatric doctors, 
nurses and pharmacists.  The public may also need to be educated and made aware 
that medication errors occur and “to err is human”.  A medication safety resource that 
can be used to assist education establishments and applied internationally would be 
the WHO report on the role of pharmacovigilance centres in reporting and learning 
systems for medication error, of which human factors is mentioned as a potential tool 
to learn from errors [32].   James Reason in 1995 reported that knowledge of human 
factors is required to understand adverse events in medicine and that managing 
human risk can never be 100% effective.  It is acknowledged from his report that 
human fallibility can be moderated but not eliminated; people do not act in isolation 
and that the likelihood of an unsafe act being committed is heavily influenced by the 
nature of the task and the workplace condition [33].    
   Human factors is defined as:  “Enhancing clinical performance through an 
understanding of the effects of teamwork, tasks, equipment, workspace, culture, 
organisation on human behaviour and abilities, and application of that knowledge in 
clinical settings.” [34].  Although human factors has been known since the 1990s, there 
have been very few published articles on addressing medication safety using a human 
factors approach with only two studies that have related it to medication and patient 
safety in intensive care units [35-36].  In terms of education, a report in 2009 
highlighted that there were gaps in the curricular content with regards to the 
epidemiology of adverse events and errors, root cause analysis and quality 
assessment in the undergraduate education of healthcare professionals.  The report 
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found that theoretical aspects of the curricular content for example epidemiology of 
adverse events, and how it could be applied to directly to an organisational context 
was found to be either absent from the healthcare professional undergraduate course 
content or covered with limited exposure [37]. A systematic review of patient safety 
education for undergraduate medical students in 2011 showed that the addition of 
patient safety education into the medical school curriculum was most commonly 
implemented in medical schools in countries such as the USA and the UK [38].   The 
GMC report in 2015 regarding patient safety titled “First do no harm”, was written to 
focus on the importance of patient safety in driving up standards of education and to 
support medical schools’ patient safety initiatives [39].  This report, based on a GMC 
conference, concluded that curricula needed to address several key areas including: 
inter-professional working, including with non-clinical managers; the science of human 
error, and the system and human factors involved; clinical governance – including root 
cause analysis and other tools used to learn from incidences; the importance of quality 
improvement science in making care safer; lessons learnt from other industries with a 
strong safety culture; and the importance of challenging unsafe practice and the ways 
in which this could be done effectively [39].  Several UK medical schools have mapped 
their safety teaching to the WHO multi-professional patient safety curriculum guide 
[40].  The General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) in the UK specifies that “there must 
be clear procedures to address concerns about patient safety arising from initial 
pharmacy education and training. Concerns must be addressed immediately” and also 
as a learning outcome, students must know how to identify, report and prevent errors 
and unsafe practice [41].  How this is achieved is open to interpretation by the higher 
education institutions accredited to teach pharmacy undergraduates.   The Royal 
College of Nursing (RCN) have included patient safety and human factors as their 
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standard of education and training which they envisage being adopted by all 
healthcare professionals in the future. Their focus however, has been on interventions 
such as communication, leadership, safety culture, stress and fatigue, teamwork and 
work environment, rather than directly addressing error prevention and learning from 
previous adverse events [42].  The main principle focus, of the RCN patient safety 
initiatives was on the impact that nurse staffing levels could potentially have on health.  
A guideline was published by the RCN on safe nurse staffing levels in the UK [43-44]. 
The NMC standard number 36 for pre-registration nursing education states that 
“Knowledge on management of adverse drug events, adverse drug reactions, 
prescribing and administration errors and the potential repercussions for safety” – is 
required, however there is no specific information on how this can be achieved in the 
education of the nursing student [45].  In the North East of England, UK, the 
organisation – Health Education North East, has a faculty of patient safety, which 
works across a region in England aimed at delivering education based on the needs 
of the patients as well as curriculum requirements in order to improve patient care. 
Examples of some of the initiatives from the faculty include guidelines for healthcare-
related undergraduate students to recognise and initially treat sepsis and recognise 
acute kidney injury [46].   
Finally, near misses and the study of these events, is equally as important as studying 
and investigating major (serious and fatal) adverse events [47].  A recent study from 
aviation has suggested that commercial airlines can benefit from learning from all near 
misses rather than certain near misses that are considered important.  Although this 
is considered labour and resource intensive, they can theoretically, offer a mechanism 
for continuing safety improvements, above and beyond learning gleaned from 




3. Summary and the way forward 
In order for medication and patient safety to move forward and improve, a change of 
culture is required from not just organisations but the public with regards to the fact 
that to “err is human” and that there are often many causes contributing to the 
occurrence of an error.   It can be seen through the media that there is still public 
interest in the prosecution of the person at the end of the chain of error. Little is done 
however to examine the cause of the error using a holistic approach which will examine 
the root cause and organisation factors that may have contributed to the error.  This, 
along with the fear of healthcare professionals reporting medication error, means that 
there is a possibility that learning opportunities from black boxes are being concealed.   
It is important to note that there needs to be a thorough and open investigation to 
highlight the potential multifactorial cause of error and that fear of prosecution among 
staff and carers being blamed for negligence before the end of the investigation may 
hinder the identification of the causes.  The results of these investigations also require 
reporting and publishing so that similar events do not happen in other organisations 
that may have the same adverse event risk due to human factors.   
Further research is required to identify a black box in healthcare which can take shape 
as an open loop system that can potentially give investigational teams access to the 
exact situation when a potentially serious error occurs.  The black box can be used to 
create simulations of real life scenarios to train future healthcare professionals to 
operate safe and effectively which can be incorporated into the curriculum.  The black 
box should include a method of recording and retrieving the events that lead to 
medication errors during the prescribing, supply and administration process, without 
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the potential of being tampered with.  As it is not known what the nature of the potential 
errors will be, it will need to be sensitive and flexible to capture the error and event 
holistically.  An investigational team would ideally be independent from the 
organisation and should have a robust method of keeping record of the incident 
investigations in the form of a repository.    Finally, there should be national and global 
initiatives to enable healthcare professionals across the globe to learn from errors.  
The theme of the WHO 3rd Global Patient Safety Challenge is medication safety and 
is due to be launched in the first quarter of 2017 [48]. The aim of the Challenge is to 
reduce the harm associated with medication through greater involvement and 
commitment by professional bodies and governments.  There is a need to address 
medication safety and a black box recording system to address the medication safety 
issue in patients, in particular in pediatrics.   
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Table 1 – comparison of adverse event management in aviation and healthcare 
(adapted from Kapur et al 2016 [19]) 
 
 Aviation Healthcare 
Adverse event - Major adverse events are 
always investigated by a 
national body 
 
- Major adverse events are 
often featured in the media 
 
- Pilot immunity is often part of 
the reporting culture 
 
- Adverse event investigation 
reports are always published. 
- Major adverse events are 
usually only investigated at 
a local level within the 
organisation, though may 
occasionally be subject to 
a wider investigation 
 
- Major adverse events only 
occasionally feature in the 
media 
 
- Immunity is not necessarily 
part of the reporting 




- Adverse event 
investigation reports are 
seldom published 
 
